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The Right To Choose How To Die:
A Constitutional Analysis of State Laws
Prohibiting Physician-Assisted Suicide
David L. Sloss*
Physician-assisted suicide (PAE) is an emotionally charged issue that state
legislators struggle with more and more each year. In this note, David Sloss
examines whether the right to voluntary PAE is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Sloss argues that all competent,
terminally ill patients have a fundamental right to die with dignity. He con-
cludes that no state should place a substantial obstacle, or undue burden, in
the path of a competent patient with an objectively rational desire to die.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Claire Renan was a ninety-year-old woman suffering from cancer of the
rectum.' Determined to die, she asked her physician to prescribe death-induc-
ing medication. 2 The physician refused and instead referred her for two psy-
chiatric examinations. Both psychiatrists concurred that Mrs. Renan "was not
truly depressed, but rather was reacting logically, albeit dramatically, to what
was, for her, an unendurable existence."'3 Unable to care for herself, Mrs. Re-
nan reluctantly agreed to enter a nursing home. Mrs. Renan's physician de-
scribed her patient's plight:
When she was awake, she asked incessantly when the end would come. She
accused me of abandoning her because I said I would not and could not give
her a lethal injection. She inveighed against the staff at the nursing home for
being insufficiently caring because nothing they did relieved her suffering....
She finally died, after months of gradual blood loss and minimal nourishment
4
Jane Doe, a retarded thirty-three-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative
state, had been mentally retarded since infancy.5 She suffered from a progres-
sive and incurable disorder of the central nervous system.6 Doe's guardian
petitioned the court to authorize removing the tube which had provided Doe
artificial hydration and nutrition for eight years. 7 As long as the tube remained
in place, the prognosis was for "an indefinite continuation of Doe's persistent
vegetative state."'8 If the tube were removed, " 'then [Doe] would likely die of
dehydration in a matter of days.' "9 The court granted the guardian's request to
remove the feeding tube, reasoning that Doe would have requested withdrawal
of treatment if she were competent.' 0
1. See MuRtaL. R. GIuicK, CHoosING MEDicAL CARE IN OLD AGE: WHAT KID, How MucH,
WHEN TO STOP 82 (1994).
2. Id. at 86.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 87.
5. Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Mass. 1992).
6. Id. at 1266.
7. Id at 1265-66.
8. l at 1269.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1272.
[Vol. 48:937
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Although Jane Doe was never legally competent, and had never expressed a
desire to die, the law allowed her doctors to end her life. By contrast, even
though Claire Renan was legally competent and repeatedly expressed a desire
for her physician to help her die with dignity, the law prohibited her doctor
from helping to end her life. Of course the law must limit the extent to which
physicians may act to hasten a patient's death, but should the law define those
limits to permit involuntary physician-assisted euthanasia of incompetent,
nonterminal patients, such as Jane Doe, while prohibiting voluntary physician-
assisted euthanasia for competent, terminally ill patients, such as Claire
Renan?1'
While some may contend that removing a feeding tube is not physician-
assisted euthanasia, this note uses the term "physician-assisted euthanasia"
(PAE) to refer both to acts that hasten death by providing an artificial death-
inducing agent ("artificial PAR"), and to acts that hasten death by withholding
or withdrawing artificial life-sustaining medical treatment ("natural PAR"). 1 2
The term "physician-assisted suicide" is a synonym for artificial PAE.1 3
Scholarly journals have recently published numerous commentaries, both
for14 and against 15 physician-assisted suicide. Often, these commentaries as-
11. This note uses the term "voluntary euthanasia" to refer to assistance provided to a rational,
competent adult who makes a considered choice to end his life. The term "involuntary euthanasia"
refers to a choice made by a surrogate decisionmaker to end the life of an incompetent person. A grey
area exists between the two extremes, for example, if a now incompetent person, when previously com-
petent, expressed an unwritten, ill-defined wish not to be kept alive if she ever entered a permanent
vegetative state.
12. For a justification of the view that withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment does consti-
tute physician-assisted euthanasia, see notes 71-73 infra and accompanying text.
13. Some commentators use the term "assisted suicide" to refer to cases where the individual who
seeks death performs the last act resulting in death, and the term "voluntary euthanasia" to refer to cases
where someone else performs the last act resulting in death. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Are Laws against
Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HAsTINGs CENTER REPORT May-June 1993, at 32, 35. One problem
with this terminology is that, in common parlance, "physician-assisted suicide" refers only to acts that
end life by means of a death-inducing agent, and not to acts that induce death by withdrawing artificial
life support. Hence, this note uses the term "physician-assisted suicide" as a synonym for "artificial
PAE," and uses the term "PAE' generically to include all forms of physician-aided dying, whether
artificial or natural, voluntary or involuntary.
14. See, e.g., Joan W. Dalbey Donahue, Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A "Right" Reserved for
Only the Competent?, 19 VT. L. Rav. 795 (1995) (arguing that incompetent individuals retain the right
to choose to end their lives, but that only the person who has executed an advanced-directive prior to
becoming incompetent has an adequate means of effectuating that right); Dr. G. Steven Neeley, The
Constitutional Right to Suicide, the Quality of Life, and the "Slippery-Slope": An Explicit Reply to
Lingering Concerns, 28 AKRON L. REv. 53, 76 (1994) (arguing that competent adults should be allowed
to solicit the assistance of others in order to make death as dignified as possible); john a. powell &
Adam S. Cohen, The Right to Die, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 169 (1994) (arguing that courts have been "too
willing to allow an individual's desire to end her life to be outweighed by other considerations or by
onerous burdens of proof"); Kathryn L. Tucker & David J. Burman, Physician Aid in Dying: A Humane
Option, a Constitutionally Protected Choice, 18 SEATrLE UNiv. L. REy. 495, 508 (1995) (concluding
that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty to choose between a tortured, hideous death and a
less painful, more dignified one, and it protects the equality of all who seek to make that fundamental,
personal choice"); Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARv. L.
REv. 2021, 2023 (1992) [hereinafter "Harvard Note"] (arguing that "a balancing test is the best doctrinal
approach for determining the scope of the right to die with assistance").
15. See, e.g., Robert A. Destro, The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest: Does
the Constitution Encompass a Right to Define Oneself out of Existence?: An Exchange of Views with
john a. powell, Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 183, 186 (1994)
April 1996]
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sume that PAE is illegal throughout the United States. In fact, every state in
the United States permits "natural" PAE. 16 States prohibit only "artificial"
PAE.
Current law relies heavily on the distinction between artificial and natural
PAE, and accords little weight to the distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary PAE. Thus, judges have disallowed voluntary, artificial PAE for com-
petent, terminally ill patients such as Claire Renan, 17 but have allowed
involuntary, natural PAE for incompetent, nonterminal patients such as Jane
Doe.18 Should there be a blanket approval for natural PAE, and an outright ban
on artificial PAE, without distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia, competent and incompetent patients, or terminal and nonterminal
patients?
This note considers whether state laws that prohibit voluntary physician-
assisted suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 19 Part
II argues that competent, terminally ill patients have a fundamental right2o vol-
untarily to end their lives by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment,2 ' that
is, a fundamental right to natural voluntary PAE.
(asserting that "the right to die does not exist as a matter of moral logic or constitutional theory"); Arthur
J. Dyck, Beyond Theological Conflict in the Courts: The Issue of Assisted Suicide, 9 NoTRE DAME J.L.
E-mics & PuB. POL'Y 503 (1995) (arguing that there exist nontheological reasons for retaining laws
against assisted suicide and euthanasia); Kamisar, supra note 13, at 37 (arguing that laws permitting
suicide reveal that our "suicide permissive society" exhibits a disregard for life); Edward J. Larson,
Seeking Compassion in Dying: The Washington State Law Against Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE UNIV.
L. REv. 509, 519 (1995) (concluding that there is an "insufficient constitutional basis to overrule [the]
judgment of the people" that physician-assisted suicide should be banned); Thomas J. Marzen, "Out,
Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 21 HAsN'mcs CONsT. L.Q.
799, 803 (1994) (claiming that "the asserted liberty interest in assisted suicide has no historical basis and
is not an implicit right under the Fourteenth Amendment's 'liberty' guarantee"); Nancy J. Osgood,
Assisted Suicide and Older People-A Deadly Combination: Ethical Problems in Permitting Assisted
Suicide, 10 Issues L. & MED. 415, 418 (1995) (claiming that arguments in support of a right to assisted
suicide for older people reveal a devaluation of old age); Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, the
Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation," 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1245, 1246 (1995) (concluding
that "because both suicide and assisted suicide were proscribed when the ratifiers adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment there is no constitutional right to seek assisted suicide").
16. See notes 40-50 infra and accompanying text for a summary of statutory and case law estab-
lishing the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
17. See notes 74-82 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving voluntary,
artificial euthanasia.
18. For a discussion of judicial decisions permitting involuntary natural euthanasia, see notes 154-
156 infra and accompanying text.
19. The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 1.
20. The Supreme Court has used the terms "fundamental rights" and "fundamental liberty inter-
ests" interchangeably to refer to those rights that merit heightened scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause. This note uses the terms accordingly.
21. Advocates and critics of physician-assisted suicide agree that the right to physician-assisted
suicide cannot qualify as fundamental unless the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment also qualifies as
fundamental. The question whether the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is fundamental remains
unsettled, since the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. See notes 32-39 infra and accompanying
text. Since I am unaware of commentaries that include a detailed analysis of this unsettled question, an
extended discussion of this question is necessary to lay the groundwork for a constitutional analysis of
physician-assisted suicide.
[Vol. 48:937
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Part mR argues that all competent, terminally ill patients have a fundamental
right to choose how to die,22 which includes a right to both natural and artificial
voluntary PAE. This argument has three components. First, the liberty inter-
ests of competent, terminally ill patients who seek natural PAE are indistin-
guishable from the liberty interests of competent, terminally ill patients who
seek artificial PAE;23 both share a fundamental interest in choosing how to die.
Second, there is no significant ethical distinction between natural and artificial
PAE. Third, the risks associated with artificial PAE are no greater than the
risks associated with natural PAE.
Part IV considers both who should be eligible to exercise the fundamental
right to physician-assisted suicide, and the extent to which states may regulate
the exercise of this fundamental right. This Part argues that the state may not
place a substantial obstacle, or undue burden, in the path of a competent patient
with an objectively rational desire to die who seeks voluntary PAE.
R. THE RIGHT To REFUSE LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT
Though the Supreme Court has held that a competent person has a signifi-
cant liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,24 difficult ques-
tions remain unsettled: (1) whether that liberty interest is sufficiently weighty
to be deemed "fundamental," and if so, (2) whether that fundamental right is
broad enough to encompass the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to
refuse even life-sustaining medical treatment. 25
A. Is the Right To Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment a Fundamental
Right?
Laws that infringe "fundamental" liberty interests merit heightened scrutiny
under the Due Process Clause. A particular liberty interest will be deemed
"fundamental" if the court concludes that the right is "deeply rooted in this
22. Deciding who precisely may exercise a fundamental right to choose how to die is a particu-
larly difficult question. If such a fundamental right exists, then the state has an important interest in
limiting the class of people eligible to exercise that right. Parts II and III.A of this note refer to members
of the eligible class as "competent, terminally ill patients." Part 1I.B suggests that this class includes all
competent patients with a subjective desire to die that is objectively rational. Part IV analyzes in greater
detail the eligibility criteria.
23. This note uses the terms "artificial life support," "life-sustaining treatment," and "life-sus-
taining medical treatment" interchangeably.
24. Washington v, Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) ("respondent possesses a significant lib-
erty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (state may not compel
robbery suspect to undergo surgery to remove bullet from chest, even though surgery might have pro-
duced incriminating evidence); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891) (holding that in a
civil action for personal injury, the court may not order plaintiff, without his or her consent, to submit to
a surgical examination to assess the extent of the plaintiff's injuries).
25. Courts have held that the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment extends even to
incompetent patients who are not terminally ill. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990); see also note 45 infra. Thus, the class of people eligible to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment contains a broader range of individuals than just competent, terminally ill patients. However,
since the chief purpose in Part II is to lay the groundwork for a discussion of physician-assisted suicide,
Part II focuses on the rights of competent, terminally ill patients.
April 19961
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Nation's history and tradition. '26 The right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition, specifically, in the
common law tradition according every individual the legal right to control his
own body. More than one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated: "No
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others .... -27 Similarly, while
serving on the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Cardozo wrote: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body .... -28 The common law accorded such primacy
to an individual's right to control his own body that "even the touching of one
person by another without consent and without legal justification was a
battery."29
In the context of the doctor-patient relationship, the common law principle
of control over one's own body manifested itself in the tort doctrine of in-
formed consent. "Under the common law of torts, the right to refuse any medi-
cal treatment emerged from the doctrines of trespass and battery, which were
applied to unauthorized touchings by a physician." 30 Moreover, at common
law, a surgeon who performed an operation without his patient's consent was
guilty of an intentional tort and was liable for damages. 31
Thus, at common law, the basic right to control one's own body encom-
passed an explicit right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, as expressed in
the doctrine of informed consent. Since the common law right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition,
it clearly is a fundamental right.
26. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (recognizing that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family because of the historical and traditionally important role the family
has played in American society). The Moore standard is a variant of Justice Cardozo's widely cited
phrase: "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). There appears to be no substantive difference be-
tween these two formulations. The other standard frequently used to assess whether a particular right
qualifies as fundamental is that it must be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connect-
icut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (noting that there is no fundamental right to a jury trial or to immunity
from prosecution except as the result of an indictment). In this author's view, the Palko standard is
more difficult to apply than the Snyder/Moore standard. Therefore, this note uses the Snyder/Moore
standard.
27. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251.
28. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled by Bing
v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
29. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
30. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,294 n.4 (1982) (explaining that the Constitution recognizes that
mental patients have a liberty interest in deciding for themselves whether to submit to drug therapy).
31. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
[Vol. 48:937
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B. Is that Fundamental Right Broad Enough To Encompass the Right of a
Competent Terminally Ill Patient To Refuse Life-Sustaining
Medical Treatment?
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,32 the Supreme
Court did not decide whether the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment is fundamental. 33 The Court assumed, for purposes of that case, that "the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. '34 The Court bal-
anced the individual's right against the relevant state interests, 35 and upheld a
Missouri law requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent pa-
tient's wishes before a third party could exercise on behalf of that patient her
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.36
The Court could have reached the same conclusion by holding that the right
to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition is fundamental, and then applying
an "undue burden" analysis. Under the undue burden standard, "a law which
serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself," does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment even if the law "has the incidental effect of
making it more difficult" to exercise the fundamental right at issue.37 In
Cruzan, the Court emphasized that the Missouri law was not designed to strike
at the right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. Rather, the Court said
that "Missouri has in effect recognized that under certain circumstances a surro-
gate may act for the patient in electing to have hydration and nutrition with-
drawn in such a way as to cause death."'38 The Court characterized the
Missouri requirement for clear and convincing evidence as a "procedural safe-
guard" designed "to assure that the action of the surrogate conforms as best it
may to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent. '39 Thus, Mis-
souri's evidentiary requirement should survive undue burden scrutiny, because
the law is designed to protect the exercise of the patient's right, not to inhibit
the exercise of that right. Therefore, the Court's holding in Cruzan is consis-
tent with the view that a competent, terminally ill patient has a fundamental
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
Since the seminal 1976 case of In re Quinlan,40 eighteen state courts of last
resort have decided thirty-one cases involving the right of patients with incur-
32. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
33. Four justices asserted that a competent, terminally ill adult has a fundamental right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at 304-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun); id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 279. The Cruzan Court spoke generally about the rights of competent adults, without
distinguishing between the rights of a terminally ill patient and the rights of a patient with a nonterminal
condition. This is attributable to the fact that Nancy Cruzan was not terminally ill; "[m]edical experts
testified that she could live another thirty years." Id. at 266 n.l.
35. Id. at 279.
36. Id. at 280.
37. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (emphasis added).
38. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
39. Id.
40. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nor. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
April 1996]
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able medical conditions to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.41 Of those
thirty-one cases, only four involved competent patients. In all four cases in-
volving competent patients, the courts held that the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment encompasses a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, and that the patient's right outweighs competing state interests, including
the state's substantial interest in protecting life.42
State courts of last resort have decided twenty-seven cases involving in-
competent patients with incurable medical conditions who sought to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. Seven of those cases involved
incompetent patients who were never competent; 43 the remaining twenty in-
volved patients who had been previously competent. All twenty cases involv-
ing previously competent patients proceeded from the assumption that a
competent patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment outweighs
competing state interests. 44 Despite this common assumption, these state
courts of last resort did not all reach the same conclusions. In fifteen cases,
courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs seeking to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining medical treatment from previously competent patients.45 In four cases,
41. See notes 42-46, 154 infra. State courts of last resort have also decided several refusal of
treatment cases in which patients did not have incurable medical conditions. See, e.g., In re Dubreuil,
629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a hospital's decision to administer blood transfusions to a
patient against her wishes violated her constitutional rights of privacy and bodily self-determination);
Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a competent adult
has a constitutional right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz,
564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991) (stating that competent Jehovah's Witness adult has right to refuse life-
saving medical treatment); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (declaring that a state's interest in
having an individual available for testimony at a criminal trial is not so compelling as to force the
individual to accept blood transfusions against her will); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y.
1990) (holding that a state's interest in preserving the life of a parent for the benefit of her child does not
outweigh the parent's right to determine the course of her medical treatment and refuse transfusions); In
re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio) (providing that a state cannot compel a competent person to submit to
medical treatment against her religious belief in faith healing), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). This
note addresses only those cases involving patients with incurable medical conditions.
42. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the right of a competent 73-year-old man with Lou
Gehrig's disease, whose life expectancy was less than six months, to remove a mechanical respirator,
even though he was expected to die within one hour after its removal. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980). The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the right of a competent, terminally ill 37-year-
old woman with Lou Gehrig's disease to remove a mechanical respirator. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404
(N.J. 1987). The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the right of a competent quadriplegic patient, who was
not terminally ill but was incapable of spontaneous respiration, to remove a mechanical respirator. State
v. Mcflee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989). Finally, the Supreme Court of Nevada upheld the right of a
competent, nonterminal 31-year-old quadriplegic to remove a mechanical respirator, despite the fact that
he would die very quickly after its removal. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
43. For discussion of cases in which the patient was never competent, see notes 154-156 infra and
accompanying text.
44. Notes 45-46 infra list 19 of these 20 cases. The twentieth case is Severs v. Wilmington
Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1350 (Del. 1980) (remanding case to Court of Chancery to obtain
additional evidence before determining whether to grant plaintiff's request for removal of life support).
45. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682-83 (Ariz. 1987); McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-
Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989); In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061 (Del. 1995); Browning v. Herbert,
568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984); Estate of Longeway v. Community Convalescent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292 (I1. 1989); DeGrella v.
Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993); Joseph v. Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); In
re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); Soper v. Storar, 420 N.E.2d
[Vol. 48:937
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courts denied relief to plaintiffs seeking withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
treatment from previously competent patients on the grounds that plaintiffs
failed to prove that the patient, if competent, would have chosen to forego such
treatment. 46 Even so, all these state courts agree that a previously competent
patient with an incurable medical condition has a right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment that outweighs countervailing state interests, including the
state's substantial interest in protecting life, provided that plaintiffs prove that
the patient, if competent, would have chosen to forego such treatment.47
Although plaintiffs have litigated most cases involving refusal of life-sus-
taining medical treatment in state courts, federal district courts have decided
three such cases. In all three cases, the courts ruled that the patient's right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment was broad enough to encompass a right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and that the patient's right was suffi-
ciently weighty to overcome competing state interests.
48
In addition to judicial decisions protecting the right of competent, termi-
nally ill patients to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, forty-seven states
and the District of Columbia have enacted "living will" statutes, which author-
ize a competent patient to execute a declaration instructing his physician to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment if the declarant is in a
terminal condition and can no longer make medical decisions for himself.
49
64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363 (Wash. 1984); In re Colyer,
660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
46. Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1993); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985); In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d
607 (N.Y. 1988).
47. The consensus of state courts of last resort on this point is consistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Cruzan that a state may require a third party to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a
now incompetent patient would refuse lifesaving medical treatment before the third party can exercise
the right of refusal on behalf of the patient. See notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text.
48. One case involved a competent patient with "graft-versus-host" disease, which he contracted
as a result of a bone marrow transplant, who sought the removal of a mechanical respirator. Deel v.
Syracuse Veterans Admin. Medical Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231, 231 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). Another involved a
previously competent patient in a persistent vegetative state whose husband sought the removal of a
feeding tube. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988). The third involved a competent, 71-
year-old patient with terminal cancer who sought removal of a mechanical respirator. Tune v. Walter
Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
49. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to -.100 (1994); A=u.
Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3262 (1993 & Supp. 1995); ARK. CoDE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -217
(Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1996); CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); CorN. GEN. STAT. AN. §§ 19a-570 to -580c
(West Supp. 1995); DE.. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101-A01 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1991
& Supp. 1995); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to 27 (1991 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -
4509 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/1 to /10 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-36-
4-1 to -21 (West Supp. 1995); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-.12 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1992 & Supp. 1994); Ky. REv. STAT. AN. §§ 311.621-.644 (Baldwin
Supp. 1995); LA. Rav. STAT. AN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West 1992); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§§ 5-801 to -817 (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN. H.ELTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994 & Supp.
1995); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121
(1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon 1992); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206
(1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-401 to -416 (Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.535-.690
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to :16 (1990 & Supp. 1995); NJ.
STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1995);
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Sixteen of these living will statutes include language substantially identical to
the following: "The legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental
right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical
care, including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or with-
drawn in instances of a terminal condition. '50
Although the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment lacks the long
common law tradition associated with the right to refuse medical treatment
more generally, the Supreme Court recognizes that the scope of fundamental
rights is continually evolving. For example, in delimiting the scope of funda-
mental rights, Justice Harlan observed that the Court must strike a balance be-
tween respect for individual liberty and "the demands of organized society."51
He added:
The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as
well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A
decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive,
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.52
The common law right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is a right "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. ' 53 This tradition is a living thing.
Decisions by state and federal courts, and statutory enactments by state legisla-
tures, have expanded the traditional common law right to encompass the right
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1991 & Supp.
1995); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01-.15 (Anderson 1994 & Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, §§ 3101.1-3101.16 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.605-.660 (1990 & Supp. 1994); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5401-5416 (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.11-1 to -14 (Supp. 1995);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-12)-
1 to -22 (1994); TNN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1995); TEx. HEALTH & SArE'Y CODE
ANN. §§ 672.001-.021 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1119 (1993 &
Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993
(Michie 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.920 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE
§§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); WYo. STAT.
§§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1994).
The only states that have not enacted living will statutes are New York, Massachusetts, and Michi-
gan. All three have, however, enacted health care proxy provisions that enable a competent adult to
delegate authority to another person to make health care decisions, including the refusal or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment, on his behalf. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 201D, § 1-17 (Law. Co-op. 1994);
MtcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.5496 (Callaghan 1992); N.Y. PUB. HEALH LA-W §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney
1993 & Supp. 1996). Many of the states that have adopted living will statutes also authorize appoint-
ment of a health care proxy or surrogate.
50. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2 (1990) (emphasis added). Other state codes that identify the right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment as a fundamental right include: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7185.5 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-101 (West Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 765.102 (West Supp. 1995); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-1 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4502
(1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 3511 (Smith-Hurd 1992); KAN. STAT. Arm. § 65-28,101 (1992);
LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 (West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-402 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:2H-54 (West Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-1
(Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-102 (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251 (1987);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 (West Supp. 1996).
51. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977) (discussing fundamental rights in the
context of family sanctity).
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of a competent, terminally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
Moreover, every federal court and state court of last resort that has considered
the issue agrees that the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment outweighs countervailing state interests, in-
cluding the state's substantial interest in protecting life.54 Hence, the right of a
competent, terminally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment
qualifies as fundamental. Indeed, given the unanimity of views among state
legislatures and state and federal courts, a decision by the Supreme Court hold-
ing that this right is not fundamental "could not long survive,"55 whereas a
holding that recognizes and builds on state and federal court decisions and state
legislative enactments "is likely to be sound."'56
C. A Critique of Justice Scalia's View of Fundamental Rights
In contrast to Justice Harlan's concept of a living tradition, Justice Scalia
has proposed a bright-line rule for determining whether a particular right quali-
fies as fundamental: If there is no deeply rooted tradition of laws protecting a
right, that right cannot be fundamental.57 Applying this rule to the refusal of
life-sustaining treatment, one could argue that the right of a competent, termi-
nally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment cannot qualify as a
fundamental right, because artificial life-support measures are too recent an
invention for there to be a deeply rooted tradition of laws protecting the right to
refuse such measures.58
This argument hinges on two assumptions: (1) that one must describe the
right at issue in the narrowest possible terms59-e.g., as a right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, rather than a right to refuse medical treatment in
general; and (2) that a tradition must date back to at least the nineteenth cen-
tury, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, to qualify as deeply
rooted.60 Both assumptions are essential to the argument, because there is a
54. See notes 40-48 supra and accompanying text.
55. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Justice Scalia has stated: "It is at least true that no 'substantive due process' claim can be
maintained unless the claimant demonstrates that the State has deprived him of a right historically and
traditionally protected against state interference." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. Although Justice Scalia articulated his proposed bright-line rule in Cruzan, he did not make
this particular argument in Cruzan.
59. Justice Scalia argues this point explicitly in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6
(1989) (plurality opinion) ("We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting,
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.").
60. 1 am not aware of any opinion in which Justice Scalia has made this assumption explicit, but in
several of his opinions it is implicit. See. e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294-95 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that a right to suicide cannot be fundamental, because assisted suicide was generally outlawed
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125 (plurality opinion)
("Since it is [petitioner's] burden to establish that.., a power... is so deeply embedded within our
traditions as to be... fundamental," the absence of such power under English and early U.S. common
law "alone might defeat his case."). Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986), in
which Justice White, writing for the Court, analyzed the prohibition of homosexual sodomy in a similar
manner-noting the "ancient roots" of proscription against homosexual sodomy and tracing its criminal-
ization in 32 states throughout the 19th century.
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pre-nineteenth century legal tradition recognizing the general right to refuse
medical treatment,6 ' and there is a twentieth century legal tradition that recog-
nizes the specific right of a competent, terminally ill patient to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment. 62 In short, this argument can succeed only if one
limits the scope of fundamental rights to those specific rights (narrowly de-
fined) that were accorded positive legal protection in the nineteenth century.
But the Supreme Court has consistently rejected this stagnant view of sub-
stantive due process. 63 In the words of Justice Frankfurter:
The Due Process Clause places upon this Court the duty of exercising a judg-
ment ....
... To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by
freezing "due process of law" at some fixed stage of time or thought is to
suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a func-
tion for inanimate machines and not for judges .... 64
In keeping with this more expansive view of the scope of fundamental rights,
the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey explicitly rejected Justice Scalia's proposed rule, arguing that this rule is
inconsistent with numerous Supreme Court decisions. The Casey joint opinion
explained: "It is . . .tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause
protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were pro-
tected against government interference by other rules of law when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified.... But such a view would be inconsistent with
our law." 65
Justice Scalia has proposed another variant of the bright-line rule for deter-
mining whether a particular right qualifies as fundamental: If there is a deeply
rooted tradition of laws denying a right, then that right cannot be fundamen-
tal.66 Applying this rule in Cruzan, Justice Scalia argued that the asserted right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment could not qualify as fundamental,
because there is a deeply rooted tradition of laws prohibiting assisted suicide.67
61. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 40-50 supra and accompanying text.
63. However, a few Supreme Court decisions have adopted Justice Scalia's narrow view of the
scope of fundamental rights. E.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186 (focusing on "homosexual sodomy" rather
than "consensual sexual activity"); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion) (focusing upon
"the societal tradition regarding the natural father's rights vis-d-vis a child whose mother is married to
another man," rather than upon "parenthood" rights in general). However, these decisions depart from
the dominant trend of recent substantive due process jurisprudence, best exemplified by the joint opinion
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
64. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847. The Casey joint opinion asserts that the following Supreme Court
decisions are inconsistent with Justice Scalia's proposed rule: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Id.
66. According to Justice Scalia: "The protection need not take the form of an explicit constitu-
tional provision or statutory guarantee, but it must at least exclude ... a societal tradition of enacting
laws denying the interest." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 n.2 (plurality opinion).
67. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,294-95 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(tracing the criminalization of attempted and assisted suicide from English common law through 50
years following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).
[Vol. 48:937
HeinOnline  -- 48 Stan. L. Rev. 948 1995-1996
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
This argument fails to recognize the important qualitative and quantitative
distinctions between a terminally ill patient's refusal of life-sustaining medical
treatment and a physically healthy, but depressed, individual's decision to end
his life. The quantitative distinction is that the terminally ill patient has a fairly
short life expectancy, 68 whereas the depressed person might have a life expec-
tancy of several decades. The qualitative distinction is that the terminally ill
patient's condition is incurable,69 whereas the depressed person could poten-
tially be cured. A vast majority of state legislatures recognize the quantitative
and qualitative differences between suicide and refusal of life-sustaining treat-
ment. More than forty states and the District of Columbia specify in their liv-
ing will statutes that death resulting from the refusal of life-sustaining medical
treatment in accordance with the statute does not constitute suicide. 70 Thus, the
deeply rooted tradition of laws prohibiting assisted suicide does not apply to
refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. And because there is no deeply
rooted tradition of laws denying the right of a competent, terminally ill patient
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, Justice Scalia's proposed bright-line
rule does not invalidate the claim that a competent, terminally ill patient has a
fundamental right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
D. Refusal of Treatment and PAE
What are the implications of the fundamental right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment for PAE? Euthanasia is defined as "the act of putting to death pain-
lessly or allowing to die, as by withholding extreme medical measures, a person
or animal suffering from an incurable, esp[ecially] a painful, disease or condi-
tion."'71 Hence, physician assistance in allowing a terminally ill patient to die
by withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment clearly qualifies as
"physician-assisted euthanasia."
In this note, the term "natural" PAE describes the withholding or with-
drawal of artificial life-sustaining medical treatment,72 while the terms "artifi-
68. Most states' living will statutes include the element of a short life expectancy in their defini-
tions of "terminal condition." See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CoDm § 71860) (West Supp. 1996)
(" 'Terminal condition' means an incurable and irreversible condition that without the administration of
life-sustaining treatment, will, within reasonable medical judgment, result in death within a relatively
short time.").
69. Most states' living will statutes include the element of incurability in their definitions of "ter-
minal condition." See, e.g., idL
70. See, e.g., CAL. HEa~uLT & SAFETY CODE § 7191.5(a) (West Supp. 1996) ("Death resulting
from the withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining treatment in accordance with this chapter does
not constitute, for any purpose, a suicide... :). Only five state living will statutes lack such explicit
statutory provisions: CoNN. Gm. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -580c (West Supp. 1995); IDAMO CODE
§§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon 1992); OR. Rnv. STAT.
§§ 127.605-.660 (1990 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1994).
71. RAN oM HousE DICnoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 670 (2d. ed. unabridged 1987); see
also BLAcK's LAW DIcnoNaRY 554 (6th ed. 1990) (defining euthanasia as "[tihe act or practice of
painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy").
This alternative definition is incomplete because it addresses only "putting to death," not "allowing to
die."
72. A death resulting from refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment is "natural" in the sense
that life-sustaining medical treatment artificially prolongs life.
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cial" PAE and "physician-assisted suicide" describe the act of providing or
administering an artificial death-inducing agent. 73 Given this terminology, a
fundamental right to refuse life-sustaining treatment can also be described as a
fundamental right to natural PAE. In Part I, this note argues that a competent,
terminally ill patient's fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
embrace the right not only to natural PAE, but also to physician-assisted sui-
cide or artificial PAE.
mH. THE RIGHT TO PHYSIcIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
In the past two years, two federal district courts,74 two federal appeals
courts,75 and one state supreme court76 have addressed the constitutionality of
state laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.77 In Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, a federal district court held that a competent, terminally ill adult
has a fundamental right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, voluntarily
to hasten his death by ingesting a lethal dose of medication.7 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed, holding that "a liberty interest exists in the choice of how and
when one dies, and that the provision of the Washington statute banning as-
sisted suicide, as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten
their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors, violates the
Due Process Clause. ' 7 9 In Quill v. Koppell, a federal district court upheld the
constitutionality of New York statutes that penalize assisted suicide. 80 The
Second Circuit reversed, holding that "the statutes lack any rational basis and
are violative of the Equal Protection Clause.8 1 Finally, in People v. Kevorkian,
the Michigan Supreme Court held, in a divided opinion, that Dr. Jack Kevor-
73. A death resulting from lethal medication is "artificial," in the sense that lethal medication is an
artificial agent that hastens death.
74. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'4 49 F.3d
586 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd on reh'g, No. 94-35534,
1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en bane); Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
rev'd, Quill v. Vacco, No. 95-7028, 1996 WL 148605 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 1996).
75. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996)
(en bane); Quill v. Vacco, No. 95-7028, 1996 WL 148605 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 1996).
76. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995)
(denying petition from Dr. Kevorkian), and cert. denied sub nom. Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795
(1995) (denying petition from Dr. Kevorldan's patients).
77. In November 1994, Oregon voters approved the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, which would
allow doctors to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to terminally ill adult Oregon residents who
choose voluntarily to end their lives in a "humane and dignified manner." Measure 16, Oregon Death
With Dignity Act, [hereinafter Oregon Act], reprinted in Kathy T. Graham, Last Rights: Oregon's New
Death with Dignity Act, 31 Wni.mBr L. REv. 601, 637-46 (1995). A federal district court recently
held that the Oregon Act violates the Equal Protection Clause, because there is no rational relationship
between the legislative distinction between terminal and nonterminal patients and the state's interest in
permitting assisted suicide. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995).
78. 850 F. Supp. at 1462 ("[A] competent, terminally ill adult has a constitutionally guaranteed
right under the Fourteenth Amendment to commit physician-assisted suicide.").
79. Compassion in Dying, 1996 WL 94848 at 39 (9th Cir.) (en bane). Prior to the en bane deci-
sion, a three-judge panel had voted to reverse the District Court decision. 49 F.3d 586 (1995).
80. 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
81. Quill, 1996 WL 148605 at 11.
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kian's patients lacked a constitutionally protected right to obtain physician
assistance in acting affirmatively to end their lives.82
This Part analyzes the issues these cases raise. The analysis is divided into
three sections. The first section argues that the liberty interests of competent,
terminally ill patients who are dependent upon artificial life support and who
seek natural PAE are indistinguishable from the liberty interests of competent,
terminally ill patients who are not dependent upon artificial life support and
who seek artificial PAE;83 both classes share a fundamental interest in choos-
ing how to die. The next section contends that, within the class of competent
patients who seek PAE, there is no significant ethical distinction between those
who seek natural versus artificial PAE, but there is a significant ethical distinc-
tion between those whose desire to die is objectively rational, and those whose
desire to die is not objectively rational.84 The final section argues that artificial
PAE poses no greater risk to competent patients than natural PAE, and, in fact,
poses fewer risks to incompetent patients than natural PAE. This Part con-
cludes that all competent patients who have a subjective desire to die that is
objectively rational have a fundamental right to choose how to die, a right that
encompasses both natural and artificial PAE.
A. The Liberty Interests at Stake: The Right To Choose How To Die
A leading medical commentator on death and dying says that faith in the
possibility of a good death "has ever been a tradition of Western societies,
which in centuries past valued a good death as the salvation of the soul ....
The good death has increasingly become a myth .... The chief ingredient of
the myth is the longed-for ideal of 'death with dignity.' ",85 The ideal of death
with dignity is "mythic" in two senses. First, the reality of death often falls
short of the ideal. Second, and more important, the desire for death with dig-
nity is a powerful psychological drive that, consciously or unconsciously, moti-
vates many individuals in Western societies who face impending death. 86
82. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 733 ("[TIhe right to commit suicide is neither implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty nor deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. It would be an impermis-
sibly radical departure from existing tradition ... to declare that there is such a fundamental right
protected by the Due Process Clause."). The Michigan Supreme Court issued a single opinion gov-
erning four separate cases pertaining to Doctor Kevorkian's efforts to assist persons who wished to end
their lives. While the Michigan Supreme Court opinion does not make clear whether all of the individu-
als were terminally ill, at least one of the challengers to the Michigan law prohibiting assisted suicide
was terminally ill. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
83. In Compassion in Dying, Court of Appeals Judge Noonan argues that the two classes of pa-
tients are distinguishable: "The district court found itself unable to distinguish between a patient refus-
ing life support and a patient seeking medical help to bring about death .... Whatever difficulty the
district court experienced in distinguishing one situation from the other, it was not experienced by the
majority in Cruzan." Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. The appropriate constitutional inquiry,
though, is not whether the two classes of patients are distinguishable (which they are) but whether their
liberty interests are distinguishable. See text accompanying notes 85-107 infra.
84. See text accompanying notes 117-127 infra.
85. SHERwiN B. NuLAND, How wF Di: REaLETmIoNs ON Lim"'s FINAL CHAMR at xvi (1994).
86. The power of the death with dignity ideal is evidenced by the widespread appeal of popular
books on the subject that have been published in recent years. E.g., NoRMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE
DIREcr'vs AND TH Putsurr OF DEATH wmtH DIGNrY (1993); DONALD W. Cox, HEMLOCK's Cup: THE
STRUGGLE FOR DEATH wrTH DIGNITY (1993); DEREK HuwpHRY, DYINo wiH DmNrY: UNDERSTANDiNG
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Competent, terminally ill patients who seek natural PAE and those who seek
artificial PAE share a common interest in choosing how to die, an interest that
is often characterized as an interest in death with dignity.
1. Patients who are dependent upon artificial life support.
Martha Tune was a seventy-one-year-old patient with terminal cancer.87
She was attached to a respirator, "without which she would 'immediately expe-
rience respiratory arrest and death.' "88 She petitioned the court "to remove the
artificial life support from her.., to permit her to die with dignity."89 Thus,
Ms. Tune asserted that she had a liberty interest in choosing how to die; she
wanted to die with dignity. From her perspective, removal of the respirator
constituted a means to that end. By granting her request to withdraw life sup-
port, the court recognized her right to choose how to die.
Larry McAfee was a competent, quadriplegic adult who could not breathe
without a ventilator. He sought a court order authorizing removal of his venti-
lator and administration of a sedative by a medical professional. 90 Mr. McAfee
had "devised a means of turning off the ventilator himself by way of a timer ' 91
but had refrained from doing so "due to the severe pain he suffer[ed] when
deprived of oxygen." z92 Thus, Larry McAfee could have killed himself without
medical assistance, but it would have been a very painful death. He sought
medical assistance, in the form of a sedative, because he had a liberty interest in
choosing how to die. The court held that his right to administration of a seda-
tive was inextricably linked to his right to remove the ventilator.93 In doing so,
the court implicitly recognized his right to "die with a maximum of dignity and
a minimum of pain."'94
EUTHANASIA (1992); LEE R. KERR & DELNETrA J. KERR, NATURAL DEATH wITH DIGNITY: PROTECrING
YOUR RIGHT TO REFUsE MEDICAL TREATMENT (1990); SAMUEL L. PELuso, To LIVE AND DIE vaTH
DIGNrrY: A GUIDE TO LivrNo Wu.Ls (1991); TMOTHv E. QUnI, DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING
CHoIcES Am TAKING CHARGE (1993); ROBERT L. RsLEY, DEATH wITH DIGNITY: A Naw LAW PERMIT-
TING PHYSICIAN Anm-w-Dn'ro (1989).
87. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
88. Id. at 1452.
89. Id. at 1453 (emphasis added).
90. State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989). For a similar case involving a competent,
quadriplegic patient who sought removal of a ventilator and administration of a sedative, see McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
91. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d at 651.
92. Id. at 652.
93. Id. ("His right to have a sedative ... administered before the ventilator is disconnected is a
part of his right to control his medical treatment."). In a similar case, the Nevada Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion. McKay, 801 P.2d at 631 ("[A] patient's right to be free from pain at the
time the ventilator [or other life support system] is disconnected is inseparable from his right to refuse
medical treatment.") (quoting McAfee, 385 S.E.2d at 652).
94. This language is taken from the Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, which says:
"[P]ersons should have the clear legal choice to be ... permitted to die with a maximum of dignity and a
minimum of pain .... " UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-I102(1)(b) (Supp. 1995). Several other state statutes
also refer explicitly to peoples' interests in maintaining dignity as a rationale for the right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 7185.5 (West Supp. 1995);
IDAHO CODE § 39-4502 (1993); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5402 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANm. § 32-
11-102 (Supp. 1994).
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These cases illustrate that a competent, terminally ill patient who refuses
life-sustaining medical treatment does so not merely for the sake of refusing
treatment, but primarily because the patient has a liberty interest in choosing
how to die. Given the fact that the ideal of a good death "has ever been a
tradition of Western societies," 95 the liberty interest in choosing how to die can
also be characterized as an interest in death with dignity. Since the liberty
interest at stake in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment is an interest in
death with dignity, the fundamental right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment is equivalent to a fundamental right to die with dignity by natural PAE.
2. Patients who are not dependent upon artificial life support.
The majority in Kevorkian claimed that "the threshold question in this case
is whether the [Due Process C]lause encompasses a fundamental right to com-
mit suicide ... . ,96 But it is misleading to suggest that a competent, terminally
ill patient who seeks artificial PAE is asserting a right to commit suicide. No
state prohibits a terminally ill person, or any other person, from slashing his/her
wrists and bleeding to death, although the person who provides the knife might
be subject to criminal penalties. 97 Nor do any states prohibit a terminally ill
person, or any other person, from starving himself to death. If the liberty inter-
est at stake were an interest in committing suicide, then the analysis would be
simple. No state imposes an undue burden on the right to commit suicide,
because no state prohibits a person from committing suicide.
Similarly, it is misleading to suggest that those who seek artificial PAE are
asserting a "right to die." Death is not a right; it is a biological necessity. The
Supreme Court long ago recognized that the right at stake in the abortion con-
troversy is not the right to an abortion, but rather the right of a pregnant woman
to choose whether to have an abortion. 98 Similarly, courts should recognize
that the right at stake in the physician-assisted suicide controversy is not the
right to die, but rather the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to choose
how to die.99
95. NutAND, supra note 85, at xvi.
96. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 724 (Mich. 1994) (subsequent history omitted).
97. State laws on assisting suicide vary considerably. For a detailed discussion of state laws on
assisting suicide, see Thomas J. Marzen, Mary K. O'Dowd, Daniel Crone & Thomas J. Balch, Suicide:
A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1985).
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
99. In Compassion in Dying, the district court relied heavily on the following passage from Casey.
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd on
reh'g, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). Judge Rothstein argued that choices about how to
die are no less central to personal dignity and autonomy than choices about whether to have an abortion.
It. at 1459-60. This note does not place great weight on the abortion analogy, because the link between
abortion and PAE is too attenuated to establish a fundamental right to die with dignity on the basis of the
established abortion right. Even so, the abortion analogy is instructive in distinguishing between an
asserted right to die (which I am not claiming) and a right to choose how to die (which I am claiming).
A pril 19961
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Recall the case of Claire Renan.' 00 Her physician's refusal to provide
death-inducing medication did not prevent Claire Renan from exercising a sup-
posed "right to die"; she died fairly soon after being diagnosed with cancer. 101
Nor did her physician's refusal to provide death-inducing medication prevent
her from committing suicide; she could have committed suicide if she chose to
do so. 10 2 However, the physician's refusal constrained Mrs. Renan's ability to
exercise her right to choose how to die. Although she wanted to die with a
minimum of pain and a maximum of dignity, she was forced to die with a
maximum of pain and a minimum of dignity.103 In sum, the right at stake for
competent, terminally ill patients who seek artificial PAE is neither a right to
commit suicide nor a right to die, but rather a right to choose how to die.
3. Comparing the two classes of patients.
Competent patients who are dependent upon artificial life support and who
seek natural PAE have a liberty interest in choosing how to die, which I call an
interest in death with dignity. Similarly, competent, terminally ill patients who
are not dependent upon artificial life support and who seek artificial PAE have
an identical liberty interest in choosing how to die. Since the first class of
patients has a fundamental right to die with dignity by natural PAE, it follows
that the second class of patients also possesses a fundamental right to die with
dignity by artificial PAE.
Some claim that the right to natural PAE and the right to artificial PAE are
distinguishable, because the former is a "negative right," whereas the latter is a
"positive right."1 4 "Whereas a positive right is a right to be provided with a
particular good or service by others, a negative right is a right to be free from
some action taken by others."' 05 There are two problems with this argument.
First, courts have held that the right to natural PAE includes the right to admin-
istration of a sedative.' 06 Therefore, the right to natural PAE includes both
negative and positive rights. Second, and more important, discussion of nega-
tive versus positive rights obscures the fact that the interests of patients who
seek natural PAE are indistinguishable from the interests of patients who seek
artificial PAE: both have a common interest in choosing how to die. The dis-
tinction between negative and positive rights relates not to the interests of the
two classes of patients, which are identical, but to the means by which those
interests are satisfied.
Given the identity of interests between the two classes of patients, the bur-
den rests with the critics of physician-assisted suicide to advance some ration-
100. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
101. See Gillick, supra note 1, at 82-91.
102. Mrs. Renan was presumably physically capable of committing suicide, since she lived at
home without full-time help for some time after the initial cancer diagnosis. See id. at 84-85.
103. See id. at 84-87.
104. Giles R. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SErMr-.E
UNIv. L. R-v. 473, 478-79 (1995).
105. Id. at 479 n.9 (quoting Tom L. BE ucHmP & JAmsS F. COU.Dr ss, PmNcn'..Es OF BioNmi-
cAL Ermcs 72-73 (4th ed. 1994)).
106. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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ale for the claim that the liberty interests of one group are "fundamental,"
whereas the liberty interests of the other group are not. Critics of physician-
assisted suicide have advanced two such rationales. First, they contend, there
are significant ethical differences between natural and artificial PAE. Second,
they argue, the practice of artificial PAE poses greater risks than the practice of
natural PAE. The following two sections address these arguments.
B. Artificial Versus Natural PAE: Ethical Considerations
Broadly speaking, one can categorize ethical views about voluntary PAE
for competent patients107 as either "pro-life"'08 or "pro-choice."' 0 9 The pro-
life and pro-choice positions agree on three points: (1) Involuntary PAE for a
competent patient who wants to live is morally wrong; (2) Voluntary PAE for a
depressed, physically healthy individual is also morally wrong;" l0 and (3) It is
ethically appropriate to withdraw life support from a competent, terminally ill
patient who requests withdrawal of life support."'
The next section presents a critique of the pro-life view, using the cases of
Martha Tune and Claire Renan, respectively, as exemplars of natural and artifi-
cial PAE. The second section presents and defends the pro-choice analysis.
Finally, the last section discusses the case of Kenneth Bergstedt to illustrate the
superiority of the pro-choice analytical framework in addressing a case that
pro-life and pro-choice advocates agree is ethically ambiguous.
1. The pro-life analysis.
Pro-life advocates attempt to draw legal and ethical distinctions between
cases like Martha Tune's and cases like Claire Renan's by claiming that Claire
Renan sought "active" physician assistance, whereas Martha Tune sought "pas-
sive" physician assistance.1 12 Withdrawal of Martha Tune's respirator was al-
107. The following discussion of the "pro-life" and "pro-choice" positions focuses on PAE for
competent patients. The issue of PAE for incompetent patients raises an entirely different set of ethical
problems, which are beyond the scope of this analysis. For a discussion of these problems, see Dona-
hue, supra note 14.
108. For a statement of the pro-life position, see, e.g., Report of the Council on Ethical and Judi-
cial Affairs of the American Medical Association, reprinted in 10 Issuas L. & MaD. 91 (1994) [herein-
after "AMA Report"]. See also Destro, supra note 15; Dyck, supra note 15. Judicial opinions
embodying the pro-life position include Judge Noonan's opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washing-
ton, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en
bane), and Chief Justice Cavanagh's opinion in People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994)
(subsequent history omitted).
109. For a statement of the pro-choice position, see, e.g., Harvard Note, supra note 14; Neeley,
supra note 14; powell & Cohen, supra note 14.
110. In the course of her pro-choice argument, Judge Rothstein says: "The court recognizes the
tragedy involved when, for example, suicide ends a young life that, with timely and appropriate counsel-
ing, could have continued." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994), aff'd on reh'g, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc).
111. The American Medical Association, which is unambiguously pro-life, says: "mhe principle
of patient autonomy requires that physicians must respect the decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment
of a patient who possesses decision-making capacity." AMA Report, supra note 108, at 93.
112. Another distinguishing factor to which pro-life advocates sometimes refer is that those who
seek artificial PAE have suicidal intent, whereas those who seek natural PAE lack such intent. For a
response to this claim, see notes 142-145 infra and accompanying text.
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legedly passive in two senses: (1) in terms of causality, the disease caused the
death; and (2) in terms of the physician's role, the physician passively allowed
nature to take its course. In contrast, if Claire Renan's physician had pre-
scribed or administered lethal medication, that medical intervention would have
caused Mrs. Renan's death, and thus the physician would have affirmatively
acted to end life. 113
Although this analysis is superficially appealing, it is impossible to distin-
guish Martha Tune's case from Claire Renan's case on the basis of causality.
Suppose that Martha Tune had asked her physician to do everything possible to
keep her alive, and he disconnected her respirator against her will. All would
agree that the physician caused her death in this case. Yet the mechanics of
causality are no different in this hypothetical than in the actual Tune case; in
both cases, the act of disconnecting the respirator was a "but-for" cause of
death, since Martha Tune would have lived longer if the respirator had not been
disconnected. Thus, the proposition that Martha Tune's physician did not
cause her death simply means that the pro-life advocate does not hold the phy-
sician morally or legally accountable for her death. The pro-life causation anal-
ysis is completely circular; pro-life advocates rely on causality to justify an
alleged ethical distinction between the Claire Renan case and the Tune case, but
the pro-life conception of causality is nothing more than a statement of the pro-
life ethical position." 4
Similarly, it is impossible to distinguish the Tune case from Claire Renan's
case on the basis of the physician's role. If Martha Tune's physician discon-
nected her respirator against her will, the pro-life advocate would surely claim
that the physician was not merely allowing nature to take its course, but was
taking an affirmative act to end her life. Yet the physician's physical act in this
hypothetical is no different from the physician's action in the actual Tune
case." 5 Again, the claim that Martha Tune's physician allowed nature to take
its course, and did not take an affirmative step to end her life, means only that
the pro-life advocate does not hold the physician morally or legally accountable
for her death. 1 6 As above, the pro-life advocate relies on the physician's role
to justify an alleged ethical distinction between the Claire Renan case and the
113. Chief Justice Cavanagh explains the distinction as follows:
{w]hereas suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life, the refusal or cessation of life-
sustaining medical treatment simply permits life to run its course, unencumbered by contrived
intervention. Put another way, suicide frustrates the natural course by introducing an outside
agent to accelerate death, whereas the refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment allows nature to proceed, i.e., death occurs because of the underlying condition.
People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (subsequent history omitted).
114. For a similar critique of the pro-life position, see Harvard Note, supra note 14, at 2029-30.
115. In Tune, the court's opinion does not specify whether a physician or someone else discon-
nected Martha Tune's respirator. The opinion merely states that the court granted Martha Tune's peti-
tion to remove her respirator. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1456(D.D.C. 1985). Regardless, whoever performed the physical act of removing the respirator, that act is
no different in the hypothetical case where Martha Tune wanted to live than it is in the actual case where
Martha Tune wanted to die.
116. See Harvard note, supra note 14, at 2028-29.
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Tune case, but the pro-life conception of the physician's role is nothing more
than a statement of the pro-life ethical position.
Hence, the pro-life analysis provides no useful criteria for drawing legal or
ethical distinctions between the cases of Martha Tune and Claire Renan, or
more broadly, between natural and artificial PAE.
2. The pro-choice analysis.
The pro-choice analysis justifies withdrawal of life support from Martha
Tune by maintaining that she had a subjective desire to die, which was objec-
tively rational. 117 Three factors make Ms. Tune's decision objectively ra-
tional:118 She had an incurable disease; She had a short life expectancy;1 19 and
She suffered unbearable pain.120
Pro-choice advocates perceive no significant difference between the Tune
case and the Claire Renan case. Claire Renan, like Martha Tune, had a subjec-
tive desire to die that was objectively rational. She had an incurable disease, 121
a relatively short life expectancy,12 - and was suffering unbearable pain.123
Therefore, the fact that Martha Tune sought natural PAE, whereas Claire Renan
sought artificial PAE, is immaterial.124
Pro-life advocates argue that the very notion that it can ever be objectively
rational to choose death over life is morally repugnant,125 because this choice
117. The "objective rationality" criterion is implicit in the writings of many pro-choice advocates.
E.g., Harvard Note, supra note 14; Neeley, supra note 14; powell & Cohen, supra note 14. At least one
trial court has relied explicitly on a rationality criterion to justify physician-assisted suicide. People v.
Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993).
118. All three criteria need not be satisfied in order for a decision to die to be "objectively ra-
tional," but all three factors must be considered in assessing the rationality of a decision to die. Some
pro-choice advocates present somewhat different criteria. See notes 192-194 infra and accompanying
text.
119. Ms. Tune had terminal cancer. Tune, 602 F. Supp. at 1453.
120. The court's opinion in Tune does not state explicitly that she was in great pain, but this is a
reasonable inference in light of the available information. See id at 1453-54.
121. Gilick, supra note 1, at 84.
122. The description of Claire Renan's case does not specify the exact time interval between the
initial diagnosis of her cancer and her ultimate death. It appears that she lived for about one or two
years after the initial diagnosis. See id at 84-87.
123. One could quibble over the degree of physical pain Claire Renan experienced. Her doctor
stated: "When Mrs. Renan became constipated ... she suffered from excruciating pain as she tried to
pass a hard stool beyond the constricting tumor mass." Id. at 84-85. But, her doctor also explained,
"[S]he really had very little physical pain, except when she was constipated." l at 90. Regardless,
there is no question that Mrs. Renan suffered great emotional pain, which "arose from her loss of inde-
pendence, from the shame of her incontinence, from fear of further decay and disintegration." Id. at 90.
The distinction between physical and emotional pain is not particularly significant in cases such as this
one, where the emotional pain results directly from the incurable medical condition.
124. In claiming that Martha Tune and Claire Renan both had an "objectively rational" desire to
die, I do not suggest that all rational people would prefer an early death under similar circumstances.
The term "rational" here means only that rational people could disagree about whether it would be better
to live or die under such circumstances.
125.
[Flor the state or one of its agents, judicial or otherwise, to act as a gatekeeper to select who
should and who should not be deemed sufficiently competent (or rational or terminal) to die
by way of assisted suicide raises obvious troubling questions .... The prospect of dividing the
sheep from the goats-those who may die and those who may not-might properly be a role
declined based on a profoundly compelling state disinterest in such business.
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implies that some lives are worth more than others. Moreover, the proposition
that some lives are worth more than others raises the specter of state-sponsored
involuntary euthanasia for those deemed unfit to live.126 This criticism is un-
founded. From the pro-choice perspective, the proposition that "some lives are
worth more than others" is true only in the following limited sense: Sometimes
it is ethically right to try to force a person to live against his will (e.g., the
classic case of the suicidal teenager); other times it is not ethically right to force
a person to live against her will (e.g., Martha Tune).127 Nonconsensual killing
of a human being, however, is just as antithetical to the principal of free choice
as it is to the sanctity of life. Thus, any notion of involuntary euthanasia is
diametrically opposed to the ethical precepts of the pro-choice position.
3. Kenneth Bergstedt-a hard case.
Kenneth Bergstedt became a quadriplegic at the age of ten as a result of a
swimming accident. 128 Despite his quadriplegia, and total dependence on arti-
ficial respiration, Kenneth completed a high school education.' 29 He "was able
to read, watch television, [and] orally operate a computer .... ,130 He also
"wrote poetry and otherwise lived a useful and productive life ... ". 1 3 1 At age
thirty-one, Kenneth petitioned the court for an order permitting the removal of
his respirator.1 32  Kenneth's decision to remove the respirator was prompted
by the impending death of his father, who had been his primary caregiver for
the previous decade since his mother had died.' 33 Kenneth did not suffer great
physical pain. Rather, his principal affliction was "fear over the quality of his
life after the death of his father."'134 The trial court granted Kenneth's petition,
the respirator was disconnected, and Kenneth died.' 35
The Bergstedt case is troubling because the three factors cited above as
elements of rationality analysis point in different directions. Kenneth's
Marzen, supra note 15, at 812 (emphasis in original).
126. Marzen says:
The purportedly objective "quality of life" judgments to be made in deciding who should live
or die by way of assisted suicide.., have much in common with judgments made by the pre-
World War HI eugenics movement. ... The specter is thus raised that if some "quality of life"
criteria can be settled upon that warrant voluntary assisted suicide, then the same criteria could
be used for other purposes.
Id. at 811.
127. Although pro-life advocates rightly reject the general proposition that "some lives are worth
more than others," they generally agree that there are cases in which it would be ethically inappropriate
to try to force someone to live against his will. See, e.g., AMA Report, supra note 108, at 92-93
(acknowledging "the right of patients to self-determination on matters of medical care even if the exer-
cise of that self-determination results in the patient's death").
128. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990).
129. Id. at 624.
130. Id. at 620.
131. Id. at 624.
132. Id. at 620.
133. Id. at 624.
134. Id.
135. The Nevada Supreme Court opinion states that the trial court granted Kenneth's petition, Ua
at 619, and that Kenneth died before the appellate process was completed, id. at 619 n.1. I infer from
this information that Kenneth died as a result of his respirator being disconnected.
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quadriplegia was incurable, but his medical condition was stable and he could
have lived for many years with artificial respiration. 136 Although the prospect
of his father's death undoubtedly caused him great emotional pain, Kenneth
might have overcome the grief from losing his father if he had found an appro-
priate substitute caregiver. 137 In short, there is no simple answer to the ques-
tion of whether Kenneth's desire to end his life was objectively rational.
Pro-life advocates contend that the failure of the pro-choice analysis to pro-
duce a clear answer in cases like Kenneth Bergstedt's stems from a flaw in the
analytic framework.138 Their argument is misguided. The analysis fails to pro-
duce a clear answer in this case because the Bergstedt case is genuinely a hard
case. Any mode of ethical analysis that pretends to offer an easy answer in
cases such as this ought to be suspect for that very reason. Conversely, the fact
that the pro-choice analysis highlights the complexity of the ethical issues in-
volved demonstrates the superiority of the pro-choice analytic framework.
The shortcomings of the pro-life analysis are evident in Justice Springer's
dissenting opinion in Bergstedt.139 Justice Springer maintains that removal of
Kenneth Bergstedt's respirator was both the "immediate and proximate cause"
of his death 40 and an affirmative act to end his life.141 But if removal of
Kenneth's respirator was the "immediate and proximate cause of his death," it
follows that removal of Martha Tune's respirator was the immediate and proxi-
mate cause of her death. If removal of Kenneth's respirator was an affirmative
act to end life, it also follows that removal of Martha Tune's respirator was an
affirmative act to end life. Thus, if one frames the analysis in terms of causal-
ity and the active/passive dichotomy, the two cases become utterly
indistinguishable.
Justice Springer anticipates this objection and offers three criteria to distin-
guish Bergstedt from cases like Martha Tune's. First, he argues that "Berg-
stedt's explicit and express desire and intention was that of putting an
immediate end to his own life."142 But Martha Tune also expressed an inten-
tion to end her life.143 Virtually every competent patient who has petitioned a
court to recognize his right to withdraw artificial life support has intended to
end his life; even so, the courts have universally recognized the right to with-
136. Id. at 620.
137. The majority opinion in Bergstedt states: "It appeared to us that Kenneth needed some type
of assurance that society would not cast him adrift in a sea of indifference after his father's passing." Id.
at 628. Hence, the court concluded that if Kenneth had survived the appellate process, "it would have
been necessary to fully inform him of the care alternatives that would have been available to him after
his father's death" before permitting removal of his respirator. Id. at 628.
138. One commentator describes the pro-choice framework as a "house of cards." He says: "The
categories relied upon to construct its case-'rational' suicide, 'terminal condition,' 'unbearable suffer-
ing,' ... cannot even be described with any certainty ...." Marzen, supra note 15, at 826.
139. Justice Springer's opinion is "pro-life" in that he would have refused Kenneth's petition for
removal of life support. The majority opinion is "pro-choice" in that the majority approved Kenneth's
petition for removal of life support. See Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617.
140. lId at 634 (Springer, J., dissenting).
141. "There was nothing natural about Mr. Bergstedt's death; he killed himself." Id. Similarly,
Justice Springer refers to "the direct and active way in which he chose to end his own life." Id. at 635.
142. Id. at 634 (Springer, J., dissenting).
143. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (D.D.C. 1985).
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draw treatment. 44 Thus, the proposition that an express intent to die disquali-
fies an individual from exercising his right to refuse medical treatment is
diametrically opposed to a firmly entrenched judicial consensus. 145
Second, Justice Springer claims that in Kenneth's case the respirator does
not constitute medical treatment.
[Aifter twenty-three years of living and breathing in this machine-aided man-
ner, the whole process becomes something quite more than mere medical treat-
ment.... [T]he ventilator begins as a form of medical treatment but ends up as
an integral part of its dependent user.146
Therefore, he argues, "[w]ithholding the ventilator was for this man not a with-
holding of medical treatment, it was the withholding of life itself."'147 This
argument has merit. But in making this assertion, Justice Springer has departed
from the pro-life analytic framework. The length of time a patient has been
connected to a machine is not relevant either to the question of what caused the
patient's death, or to the question whether the physician played an active or
passive role in ending the patient's life. Justice Springer's argument is persua-
sive because the length of time Kenneth Bergstedt had lived with his respirator
informs an assessment of the objective rationality of his desire to die.
Justice Springer's third criterion is that Kenneth "is not 'terminally ill' or
otherwise close to death."'148 Justice Springer correctly points to Kenneth's
long life expectancy as a factor that distinguishes his case from Martha Tune's.
But life expectancy is a criterion that is drawn from the pro-choice analytic
framework. 149 Thus, Justice Springer's only persuasive arguments for distin-
guishing Bergstedt from the Tune case, and hence his only persuasive argu-
ments in favor of the pro-life position, rely on the pro-choice analytic
framework.
The pro-choice and pro-life positions agree that: (1) Natural PAE for
Martha Tune is ethical, whereas artificial PAE for a suicidal teenager would be
unethical; and (2) The Bergstedt case is much more ambiguous than the Tune
case. The pro-choice analysis, by relying on objective medical factors, pro-
vides a convincing justification for these shared moral intuitions. The pro-life
analysis does not offer a persuasive explanation for these shared moral intu-
itions. Since the pro-choice analysis provides a convincing justification for our
shared moral intuitions, it makes sense to apply the pro-choice analysis to an
ethical comparison between natural and artificial PAE. The result is clear:
There is no significant ethical distinction between natural and artificial PAE,
because the distinction between artificial and natural PAE is unrelated to the
144. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652
(Ga. 1989); Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 619 (Nev. 1990); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 416 (N.J. 1987); Deel
v. Syracuse Veterans Admin. Medical Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231, 234 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
145. That proposition is also at odds with state living will statutes, none of which makes the
absence of an intent to die a precondition for exercising a living will.
146. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 634 (Springer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 635.
148. Id (quoting amicus curiae brief written by Thomas J. Marzen, general counsel for the Na-
tional Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled, at 1).
149. See text accompanying notes 117-120 supra.
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objective medical factors that constitute the framework of the only coherent
justification for our shared moral intuitions.
C. Artificial Versus Natural Euthanasia: A Comparative Risk Analysis
One argument supporting the current legal distinction between artificial and
natural euthanasia is the slippery slope argument. Opponents of physician-as-
sisted suicide charge that the "legal machinery initially designed to kill those
who are a nuisance to themselves may someday engulf those who are a nui-
sance to others."'150 There are two classes of patients who might be considered
"a nuisance to others": those who are legally incompetent; and those who are
legally competent, but extremely dependent on others (and therefore also ex-
tremely vulnerable). This section will consider each in turn.
1. Competent vs. incompetent.
Critics of physician-assisted suicide support banning the practice because
the risk that its legalization would lead to involuntary euthanasia of incompe-
tent patients outweighs any potential benefits for competent patients.' 5' While
legalization of physician-assisted suicide may pose some risk to incompetent
patients, incompetent patients face a greater risk under existing laws that permit
withdrawal of life support. Current living will statutes are specifically designed
to provide for withdrawal of life support from incompetent patients.' 52 In con-
trast, proposals for physician-assisted suicide specifically exclude incompetent
patients and provide for terminating the lives only of competent patients. 53 A
statute that authorizes PAE for incompetent patients poses a greater risk to in-
competent patients than a statute that explicitly authorizes PAE only for com-
petent patients.
With respect to patients who were never legally competent, the worst fears
of the opponents of PAE have already been realized. State courts of last resort
have considered eight cases involving withdrawal of life support from patients
who were never legally competent. In seven of those cases, courts upheld the
guardian's right to withdraw the incompetent patient's life-sustaining treat-
ment.154 Decisions to withdraw life support from formerly competent patients
150. Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation,
42 MmN. L. REv. 969, 976 (1958).
151. lad at 985-93.
152. Although a person must be competent to execute a living will, the provisions of the living
will generally do not take effect unless and until one becomes incompetent. See, for example, the model
declaration in CAL. HEmA & SAs'a=rv CODE, § 7186.5(b) (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that a precon-
dition for acting on the advance directive is that "I am no longer able to make decisions regarding my
medical treatment.").
153. See, e.g., Oregon Act, supra note 77, § 1.01(6), (11).
154. In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (Ga. 1984) (allowing parents to remove the life support
of an infant in an irreversible vegetative state and extending the holding to apply to an adult incompetent
patient); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 44 (Ind. 1991) (permitting parents to withdraw artificially
provided nutrition from a never-competent 42-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state); In re
P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (La. 1982) (allowing an appropriate representative to assert a perma-
nently comatose newborn infant's right to discontinue artificial life support); Care and Protection of
Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1378 (Mass. 1992) (entering a do-not-resuscitate court order for an infant in a
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who have become incompetent can be justified on the grounds that the patient,
if competent, would have refused artificial life support. With respect to pa-
tients who were never legally competent, however, the argument about what
the patient would have chosen, if competent, is a "legal fiction." 155 Thus,
under the guise of protecting the patient's Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
ests, 156 the courts have permitted surrogate decisionmakers to choose involun-
tary PAE for patients who have never possessed the competence to choose
between life and death. This is precisely the nightmare scenario that critics of
PAE have long feared. The law has stepped on to the slippery slope and crash-
landed at the bottom.
The slide down the slippery slope has occurred even though state legisla-
tures have drawn sharp legal distinctions between natural and artificial PAE.157
This is not surprising, because no rational relationship exists between the artifi-
cial/natural dichotomy and the avowed policy goal of protecting the rights of
incompetent patients. If one's policy objective is to protect the rights of incom-
petent patients, then a rational legal mechanism to achieve that goal is to draw
sharp legal distinctions between the rights of competent patients and the rights
of incompetent patients. It defies logic, though, to attempt to protect the rights
of incompetent patients by means of a legal framework that permits natural
PAE for both competent and incompetent patients, while prohibiting artificial
PAE for both competent and incompetent patients.
2. Voluntary vs. involuntary.
Consider patients who are legally competent, but extremely dependent on
others, and therefore vulnerable to the influence of those who suggest that they
choose death over life, even though the patients may not really want to die.- 58
One could argue that artificial PAE entails a greater risk of undue influence
than natural PAE, because living will statutes require patients to make medical
permanent vegetative coma who was a ward of the state); Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1272(Mass. 1992) (determining that a profoundly retarded 33-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state
would, if she were capable of making a choice, terminate nasoduodenal feeding and hydration); Superin-
tendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (Mass. 1977) (allowing chemo-
therapy for leukemia to be withheld from a profoundly retarded 67-year-old man); In re Guardianship of
L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Wis. 1992) (limiting its holding to persons in persistent vegetative states, and
allowing guardian to exercise patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, including artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration). Only one state court of last resort has ruled against such plaintiffs. Soper
v. Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (addressing the cases of two
incompetent patients and denying the right to deprive lifesaving medical treatment for the patient who
was never competent).
155. Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Mass. 1992).
156. There may well be good reasons for granting family members and medical professionals the
legal right to make life and death decisions on behalf of patients who were never legally competent.
However, those rights cannot be founded on a supposed Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest of the
never competent patient, because that liberty interest involves a right to choose, and a person who was
never competent lacks the capacity to choose.
157. For example, the California Natural Death Act says: "This chapter does not condone, author-
ize, or approve mercy killing or assisted suicide or permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission
to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying." CAL. HEALr & SAFETY CODE
§ 7191.5(g) (West Supp. 1995). Most other living will statutes include similar provisions.
158. See Kamisar, supra note 13, at 39.
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care decisions before their health fails, whereas proposals for physician-assisted
suicide require patients to make decisions while suffering from a terrible physi-
cal ailment. 159 Most people, however, do not execute living wills. They make
decisions about withdrawal of life support when they are suffering from a terri-
ble physical ailment as well. 160 Thus, competent patients who seek artificial
PAE are no more vulnerable to undue influence than are competent patients
who become dependent upon artificial life support and lack living wills.
If one's policy objective is to protect legally competent patients who are
vulnerable to undue influence, then it is appropriate to draw a sharp legal dis-
tinction between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, and to develop safe-
guards to ensure that patients who seek PAE do so voluntarily, not under undue
influence. Far from being a bulwark against the risk of undue influence, the
artificial-natural dichotomy has exacerbated that risk by distracting judges' at-
tention from the critical dividing line between voluntary and involuntary PAE.
Although state living will statutes authorize only voluntary euthanasia, judicial
decisions have relied on statutory distinctions between natural and artificial eu-
thanasia to legitimate the practice of natural involuntary euthanasia. 161
Instead of relying on the distinction between natural and artificial PAE to
delimit the scope of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court should hold that all
competent patients who have a subjective desire to die that is objectively ra-
tional have a fundamental right to choose how to die. The "subjective desire"
element in this constitutional standard affirms the state's substantial interest in
prohibiting involuntary euthanasia. The "objective rationality" element affirms
the state's substantial interest in discouraging irrational suicide. Finally, this
approach recognizes that the ideal of a good death is deeply rooted in the West-
ern ethical tradition, and that all competent patients with an objectively rational
desire to die share a common interest in death with dignity, regardless of
whether they seek natural PAE or artificial PAE.
IV. THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF STATE REGULATION
This Part considers the extent to which states may regulate the practice of
PAE without imposing an undue burden 162 on patients' fundamental rights.
The analysis of state regulation is divided into two parts: limitations on the
159. None of the critics of physician-assisted suicide has made this particular argument. The
critics warn at length about the dangers of undue influence associated with physician-assisted suicide,
but do not compare those dangers with the risk of undue influence associated with the withdrawal of life
support. See, e.g., id, at 38-39; Kamisar, supra note 149, at 975-77, 990-93; Marzen, supra note 15, at
811-12.
160. See, e.g., Deel v. Syracuse Veterans Admin. Medical Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231 (N.D.N.Y.
1990); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989);
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); Matter of Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987).
161. See, e.g., In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015, 1022 (La. 1982); Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d
1263, 1270 (Mass. 1992); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,423
(Mass. 1977).
162. Some argue that "strict scrutiny" is the appropriate standard for evaluating state regulation of
PAE. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 596 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated, No.
94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc) (Wright, J., dissenting) (demanding that a
statute be narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest). This note applies the undue burden
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class of eligible people, and issues concerning acceptable roles for physicians
and nonphysicians.
A. Limiting the Class of Eligible People
Under Casey, "[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is
invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability."'163 Analogously,
for our purposes, a provision of law is invalid if its purpose or effect is to place
a substantial obstacle in the path of a qualified patient seeking voluntary PAE.
But who is a qualified patient?
Part HI concluded that the fundamental right to die with dignity extends to
all those who have a subjective desire to die that is objectively rational. But
since this is a very abstract principle, more concrete guidance is needed. The
Oregon Act provides that a competent 64 adult suffering from a terminal dis-
ease, who has voluntarily expressed a wish to die, is eligible for physician-
assisted suicide. 165 It defines a "terminal disease" as "an incurable and irre-
versible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death within six (6) months."'166 Thus, the eligibil-
ity criteria under the Oregon Act are: (1) competent, (2) voluntary, (3) incur-
able and irreversible, and (4) short life expectancy. 167 The following
discussion analyzes these four criteria in terms of two sets of considerations.
First, is the criterion consistent with the principle of a fundamental right to die
with dignity? Second, what are the practical difficulties of distinguishing be-
tween those who satisfy the criterion and those who do not?
1. Competent.
As a matter of principle, excluding incompetent people from eligibility for
PAE is consistent with the fundamental right to die with dignity. The right to
die with dignity is not a "right to die," but rather a right to choose how to
die. 168 An incompetent person is, by definition, incapable of making an in-
formed choice. 169 Since incompetent people lack the capability to choose how
standard, because the undue burden approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Cruzan.
See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
163. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
164. The Oregon Act uses the term "capable," rather than "competent." It specifies that a patient
is "capable" if he or she has "the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care
providers." Oregon Act, supra note 77, § 1.01(6).
165. Id. § 2.01. The Act provides that actions taken in accordance with its terms do not constitute
either "assisted suicide" or "active euthanasia." ML § 3.14. Nevertheless, this note uses the terms "phy-
sician-assisted suicide" and "PAE' to describe the actions authorized by the Oregon Act.
166. Id. § 1.01(12).
167. The Oregon Act also mandates that a patient must be an adult. Id. § 1.01(11). I assume that
the "adult" criterion is not problematic, since most state living will statutes include this criterion as well.
See, e.g., CAL. IALTH & SMAErY CODE § 7186(h) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "qualified patient").
168. See text accompanying notes 98-103 supra.
169. The Oregon Act defines "informed decision" as a "decision by a qualified patient." Oregon
Act, supra note 77, § 1.01(7). It defines a "qualified patient" as a "capable adult." Id. § 1.01(11). It
defines a "capable adulf' as one who has the ability to make health care decisions. Id. § 1.01(6). Simi-
lar definitional provisions are included in most states' living will statutes. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTm &
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to die, laws denying them the right to choose are not an undue burden on their
fundamental liberty interests.
There are practical difficulties in distinguishing between competent and in-
competent people. The difficulty of distinguishing the two groups raises the
risk that incompetent patients will be classified as "competent," and will be put
to death without their informed consent, under the guise of voluntary euthana-
sia. Critics of physician-assisted suicide highlight this risk in support of their
argument for a ban on physician-assisted suicide.170 However, the risk to in-
competent patients cannot justify a ban on physician-assisted suicide, because
existing laws permitting withdrawal of life support pose a greater risk to incom-
petent patients than laws permitting physician-assisted suicide. 171
Even so, under the undue burden standard, states may legitimately develop
a variety of safeguards to ensure that patients seeking physician-assisted suicide
are indeed competent. For example, the Oregon Act requires two physicians to
confirm that a patient is competent before prescribing lethal medication. 172
Moreover, a patient is ineligible if a court finds that the patient is incompe-
tent.173 Such safeguards do not impose an undue burden on a competent per-
son's fundamental right to die with dignity, because they serve "a valid
purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself."'174
2. Voluntary.
Laws prohibiting involuntary euthanasia, and permitting only voluntary eu-
thanasia, are consistent with the principle of a fundamental right to die with
dignity. However, determining when a request for PAE is truly voluntary
presents substantial practical difficulties.
The Oregon Act recognizes these difficulties and includes a comprehensive
set of safeguards to help ensure that the patient is truly acting voluntarily. The
patient must make both a written and oral request for lethal medication; he
must then make a second oral request within fifteen days after the initial oral
request. At the time of the second oral request, the patient's physician must
offer the patient an opportunity to rescind the request.' 75 Two physicians must
confirm that the patient is acting voluntarily. 176 If either physician believes
that the patient "may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder,
or depression causing impaired judgment," then referral for counseling is re-
quired. 177 The patient's primary physician must inform the patient of available
alternatives, "including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care and pain
SAFET' CODE § 7186(h) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "qualified patienf); i § 7186.5(a) (limiting eli-
gibility to individuals of sound mind).
170. See, e.g., Matzen, supra note 15, at 812.
171. See notes 150-156 supra and accompanying text for further elaboration of this point.
172. Oregon Act, supra note 77, § 3.01(1), 3.02.
173. Id. § 1.01(6) (defining "incapable"); § 2.01 (delineating who is eligible).
174. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
175. Oregon Act, supra note 77, § 3.06.
176. Id §§ 3.01(1)-(3). 3.02.
177. Id. § 3.03.
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control." 178 The Oregon Act also requires extensive documentation.' 79 The
doctor may not write a prescription until 48 hours have elapsed since the time
of the patient's written request.' 80 Finally, the doctor must verify that the pa-
tient is making an informed decision. 18' These procedures clearly serve a valid
purpose, and do not have the "purpose or effect . .. to place a substantial
obstacle in the path"' 82 of a competent patient seeking to exercise his funda-
mental right to die with dignity. Therefore, such safeguards pass the undue
burden test.
Critics argue that such safeguards do not adequately protect vulnerable pa-
tients from undue influence, and that even with such safeguards in place, the
law will have the unintended consequence of putting to death many people who
do not really wish to die. Therefore, they conclude that physician-assisted sui-
cide should be banned. 183 Although no safeguards are perfect, the risk of un-
due influence is no greater in the case of physician-assisted suicide than it is in
the case of withdrawal of life support. Thus, that risk cannot justify a complete
ban on physician-assisted suicide.' 84
3. Incurable and irreversible.
A policy that limits the availability of physician-assisted suicide to people
with incurable and irreversible medical conditions, and that excludes those who
are physically healthy from the category of eligible people, is consistent with
the principle of a fundamental right to die with dignity. Rational people may
disagree about the point at which a patient's physical ailments become so
debilitating that life is no longer worth living. But a decision by a physically
healthy person to commit suicide cannot be considered "rational" in any sense
of the term. Only people with an objectively rational desire to die possess a
fundamental liberty interest in death with dignity. Thus, excluding physically
healthy individuals from eligibility for physician-assisted suicide does not im-
pose an undue burden on anyone's fundamental liberty interests.' 85
178. Id. § 3.01(2).
179. Id. § 3.09.
180. Id. § 3.08.
181. Id. § 3.04. The Act defines "informed decision" as a decision
that is based on an appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully informed by the
attending physician of: a) his or her medical diagnosis; b) his or her prognosis; c) the potential
risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed; d) the probable result of taking
the medication to be prescribed; e) the feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to,
comfort care, hospice care and pain control.
Id. § 1.01(7).
182. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (defining the
undue burden test set forth for abortion laws).
183. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586,592-93 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated,
No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en bane) (emphasizing the problems that would
result from a decision allowing physician-assisted suicide); Kamisar, supra note 15, at 38 ("[Ninety] to
100 percent of the [physician-assisted suicide] victims die while they have a diagnosable psychiatric
illness.").
184. See notes 139-157 supra and accompanying text.
185. This conclusion comports with the law governing refusal of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment. For example, living will statutes generally limit the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment to those with incurable and irreversible medical conditions. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFET'
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It would be a mistake, though, to conclude that everyone with an incurable
and irreversible medical condition is automatically eligible for physician-as-
sisted suicide. Diabetes is often incurable and irreversible, but a decision to
commit suicide merely because one has diabetes could not be considered "ra-
tional." 186 Only those with an objectively rational desire to die have a funda-
mental right to die with dignity. Therefore states may, consistent with the
undue burden standard, impose additional limitations on the class of eligible
people by excluding patients with incurable and irreversible medical conditions
who lack an objectively rational desire to die. This note shall consider such
additional limitations below. 187
Before continuing, however, it is necessary to respond to arguments about
the practical difficulties involved in determining whether a particular medical
condition is incurable and irreversible. Two such arguments exist: (1) Doctors
might misdiagnose the disease, concluding that it is incurable when it is in fact
curable;' 88 and (2) A disease that is incurable today might be curable to-
morrow.' 8 9 The Oregon Act addresses these concerns by requiring two physi-
cians to agree that the patient's condition is incurable and irreversible, thus
reducing the possibility of error.190 In light of concerns about faulty diagnoses,
this requirement clearly serves a valid purpose and does not impose an undue
burden on the patient's fundamental rights.
Critics contend that the state's legitimate interest in ensuring that patients
satisfy the "incurable and irreversible" criterion warrants additional safeguards.
While some further safeguards may be useful, 191 concerns about misdiagnoses
and miracle cures are no more salient in the case of physician-assisted suicide
than in the case of refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Since the state's interest
in ensuring that patients satisfy the "incurable and irreversible" criterion is not
sufficiently compelling to justify an outright ban on withdrawal of life support,
that interest is also not sufficiently compelling to justify an outright ban on
physician-assisted suicide.
CODE §§ 7186(h), (j) (West Supp. 1995); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 280 (1990) ("We do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and
voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death.").
186. Marzen cites the example of a diabetic to illustrate the difficulty of defining a "terminal
condition." Marzen, supra note 15, at 815. While I disagree with his conclusion, the example is never-
theless instructive.
187. See notes 191-201 infra and accompanying text.
188. "'[Ilncurability of a disease is never more than an estimate based upon experience, and how
fallacious experience may be in medicine only those who have had a great deal of experience fully
realize.'" Kanisar, supra note 150, at 997 (quoting I. Phillips Frohman, Vexing Problems in Forensic
Medicine: A Physician's View, 31 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1215, 1216 (1956)).
189. Id. at 999.
190. "Incurable and irreversible" is included within the definition of "terminal disease." Oregon
Act, supra note 77, § 1.01(12). The attending physician must determine that the patient has a terminal
disease. I. § 3.0 1(1). A consulting physician must confirm the attending physician's diagnosis in writ-
ing. d § 3.02.
191. One can readily imagine additional safeguards that would satisfy the undue burden test. For
example, one or both of the physicians might be required to be a specialist with respect to the particular
disease that the patient is diagnosed as having.
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4. Short life expectancy.
Advocates of physician-assisted suicide face a difficult dilemma when they
attempt to distinguish between patients who have a rational desire to die and
therefore are eligible for physician-assisted suicide and patients who possess an
irrational desire to die and are ineligible. In addition to the preceding criteria
(competent, voluntary, incurable and irreversible), two other criteria may be
used to distinguish the rational from the irrational: short life expectancy and
severe pain. Bearing in mind these two criteria, judges and legislators can con-
sider five possible positions to determine what class of people qualify for phy-
sician-assisted suicide: (1) Competent patients with an incurable and
irreversible medical condition need not satisfy either additional criterion to be
eligible for physician-assisted suicide; (2) One must have a short life expec-
tancy to be eligible; 192 (3) One must have severe pain to be eligible;193 (4) One
must have both a short life expectancy and severe pain to be eligible; 194 or (5)
One must have either a short life expectancy or severe pain to be eligible.
The first option-requiring only that a competent patient have an incurable
and irreversible condition, regardless of his life expectancy or the degree of
pain associated with that condition-is unsatisfactory. Such a requirement
does not distinguish between conditions such as diabetes and terminal cancer; it
would grant to both sets of afflicted patients equal rights to end life, despite the
profound difference between the effects of these conditions on the patients'
lives. Although this option does not impose an undue burden on anyone's fun-
damental right to die with dignity, it fails on policy grounds because it gives
insufficient weight to the state's interest in preserving life.
The second option-requiring that a competent patient have a short life
expectancy to be eligible for physician-assisted suicide-imposes an undue
burden on the rights of patients with extremely painful, incurable "but not im-
minently terminal, progressive illnesses such as ALS or multiple sclerosis.' 195
If a patient has a life expectancy that can be measured in years, rather than
months, but also has a reasonable expectation of experiencing constant agoniz-
ing pain, and becoming so debilitated that it will be impossible to engage in any
"normal" activities, it would surely be "rational" for such a patient to prefer an
192. This is the position reflected in the Oregon Act. Oregon Act, supra note 77, § 1.01(12)
(defining an incurable and irreversible disease as one that would produce death in six months). The
district court in Compassion in Dying also implicitly adopted this position. In that opinion, Judge Roth-
stein's eligibility criteria were: (1) adult, (2) competent; (3) voluntary; and (4) terminally ill. Compas-
sion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1455-62 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd on reh'g, No. 94-
35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banec). Judge Rothstein did not define "terminally
ill.' Most definitions, however, include the elements of incurability and short life expectancy, but ex-
clude the requirement of severe pain.
193. This is the position advocated by Dr. Timothy Quill. "The patient must have a condition that
is incurable, and associated with severe, unrelenting suffering." Qumu, supra note 86, at 162.
194. One of the dissenters in Kevorkian says: "I would hold.., that [the Michigan law] violates
the Due Process Clause insofar as it bars a competent, terminally ill person facing imminent, agonizing
death from obtaining medical assistance to commit suicide." People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714,
746 (Mich. 1994) (Levin, J., dissenting) (subsequent history omitted).
195. Qutz., supra note 86, at 162.
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early death over continued life.196 Since all competent patients with an objec-
tively rational desire to die have a fundamental right to die with dignity, the
Oregon Act is unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits physician-assisted suicide
for patients with extremely painful and incurable, but not imminently terminal,
illnesses.' 9 7
The third option-requiring that a competent patient have severe pain to be
eligible-also presents problems. States have experience in addressing the
practical problems associated with determining who meets the other criteria
discussed above (competent, voluntary, incurable and irreversible, short life ex-
pectancy), because all those criteria are embodied in living will statutes.198 In
contrast, states have little experience addressing the practical problems associ-
ated with determining who satisfies the "severe pain" criterion. Indeed, that
criterion is not embodied in any living will statute.
If the law provides that only those patients with severe current pain are
eligible, it would arguably impose an undue burden on the rights of patients
whose only "pain" is the anxiety of knowing, based upon medical diagnosis,
that they will experience severe pain in the near future. If the law provides that
only those patients with severe physical pain are eligible, it would arguably
impose an undue burden on the rights of patients whose only "pain" is the
indignity of being incontinent, confined to bed, and completely dependent upon
others. 199 But if the law defines "severe pain" in a way that accommodates the
interests of all these patients, then the "severe pain" criterion would not be
useful in discriminating between patients with a rational desire to die and those
with an irrational desire to die.
The fourth option-requiring that a competent patient have both a short life
expectancy and severe pain to be eligible for physician-assisted suicide-is not
satisfactory because it suffers from all the flaws of both the second and third
options. That is, patients suffering from a painful, nonterminal condition
would continue to suffer, and the state would still face practical difficulties in
applying the "severe pain" criterion.
The fifth option is the most promising-requiring that a competent patient
have either a short life expectancy or severe pain to be eligible for physician-
assisted suicide. But, in light of the problems associated with the "severe pain"
criterion, this option should be recast in the following terms. First, the patient
would be deemed eligible only if he satisfied all the other eligibility criteria
discussed above (competent, voluntary, incurable and irreversible), and two
196. In making this claim, I do not intend to suggest that all rational people would prefer an early
death under these circumstances. The term "rational" here means only that rational people could disa-
gree about whether it would be better to live or die under such circumstances. Granted, many rational
people would undoubtedly prefer to continue living, no matter how bleak the situation.
197. The Oregon Act excludes patients with a life expectancy of more than six months. Oregon
Act, supra note 77, § 1.01(12).
198. Not every living will statute incorporates all these criteria. However, most living will stat-
utes incorporate most of these criteria. See, e.g., CAL. HEALT- & SAFErY CODE § 7186.5(a) (West
Supp. 1995) ("of sound mind"); id. § 7186.5(b) ("voluntarily"); id. § 7186Q) ("incurable and irrevers-
ible," "result[ing] in death within a relatively short time").
199. See note 122 supra (describing Claire Renan's condition).
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physicians certified that, in their professional medical judgment, the patient had
a life expectancy of less than six months.200 Second, in lieu of a "severe pain"
requirement, a competent patient with an incurable and irreversible medical
condition who did not pass the life expectancy test would have the option of
petitioning a court to obtain a judgment that his desire to die was rational.
Judgments in favor of patients would not be subject to appeal. Although the
requirement for judicial action would undoubtedly impose a burden on patients
who did not pass the life expectancy test, this would not be an undue burden, in
light of the state's substantial interest in limiting the class of eligible patients to
those with a rational desire to die.201
B. Other Issues
Having defined the class of eligible people, two other issues merit consider-
ation. First, does the stipulation that physicians may prescribe, but may not
administer, lethal medication impose an undue burden on the fundamental right
to die with dignity? Second, do laws prohibiting people other than physicians
from assisting a suicide impose an undue burden on the fundamental right to
die with dignity?
1. Prescribing vs. administering.
The Oregon Act authorizes physicians to write a prescription for lethal
medication, but prohibits physicians from actually administering a lethal injec-
tion.202 One rationale for this prohibition is to provide an additional safeguard
to help ensure that the patient is acting voluntarily.203 Thus, the prohibition
against administering medication is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.
Even so, this provision of the Oregon Act imposes an undue burden on the
fundamental rights of patients who cannot self-administer lethal medication.
200. The six-month figure is taken from the Oregon Act, supra note 77, § 1.01(12). As a constitu-
tional matter, states would be free to use a different number, or to adopt any of the life expectancy
formulations embodied in state living will statutes-e.g., a medical condition that will "within reason-
able medical judgment, result in death within a relatively short time." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE,
§ 71860) (West Supp. 1995). Arguments about the practical difficulties associated with determining
who satisfies this criterion essentially parallel the arguments related to incurability. See notes 188-191
supra and accompanying text. In light of the potential for nisdiagnosis, a requirement that two physi-
cians concur in the diagnosis would pass the undue burden test. However, the practical difficulties
associated with evaluating life expectancy cannot justify an absolute prohibition against physician-as-
sisted suicide.
201. This proposed procedure is similar, in many respects, to the current state of the law with
respect to refusal of life-sustaining treatment. State living will statutes explicitly authorize withdrawal
of treatment from patients who have a short life expectancy. Judicial decisions have extended this right
to numerous patients who fail to satisfy the life expectancy criterion. See notes 42-48 supra and accom-
panying text.
202. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize a physician or any other person to end a
patient's life by lethal injection." Oregon Act, supra note 77, § 3.14.
203. There was also a tactical political rationale for this provision. Previous voter initiatives to
legalize physician-assisted suicide in California and Washington failed to obtain the required majority,
in part because the ballot measures did not distinguish between prescribing and administering lethal
medication. Timothy Egan, Suicide Law Placing Oregon on Several Uncharted Paths, N.Y. Tmms,
Nov. 25, 1994, at Al, B14.
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[Sluppose that a person is unable to swallow the barbiturates that will bring
about death .... If the right to control the time and manner of one's death-
the right to shape one's death in the most humane and dignified manner one
chooses-is well founded, how can it be denied to someone simply because
she is unable to perform the final act by herself?2°4
The prohibition against lethal injection presents an additional problem. Taking
medication by mouth is far less effective than lethal injection; in many cases
oral ingestion of barbiturates does not result in death, but in protracted suffer-
ing.205 Therefore, Oregon's prohibition against lethal injection also imposes an
undue burden on some patients who are capable of swallowing.
2. Assisted suicide by nonphysicians.
If the Oregon Act becomes law, it will remain a crime in Oregon for anyone
other than a physician to assist a suicide.20 6 Critics have argued that it is irra-
tional to limit the class of people eligible to assist a suicide to physicians only.
They contend that the practice of assisted suicide is fundamentally incompati-
ble with medical ethics. Therefore, they conclude, "the medical profession is,
in fact, the last class that ought to be granted" the right to assist a suicide.207
This argument proceeds from the mistaken premise that the right at issue is
a general right to die, rather than a more specific right to die with dignity. If
one claimed a fundamental right to die, then it would be difficult to justify any
prohibition against assisted suicide, either by physicians or nonphysicians. But
this note has argued not for a fundamental right to die, but rather for a funda-
mental right to die with dignity. Furthermore, there is a class of competent
patients suffering from incurable medical conditions who want to die with dig-
nity, but who require physician assistance to do S0.208 For such people, the
general prohibition against assisted suicide by nonphysicians does not impose
an undue burden on their fundamental right to die with dignity, provided that
there is a legal option to obtain physician assistance. Moreover, the general
prohibition against assisted suicide by nonphysicians is fully justified by the
state's substantial interest in protecting life.
204. Kamisar, supra note 13, at 35 (contending that the Supreme Court should not recognize a
right to physician-assisted suicide, because the right, once recognized, is not subject to any rational
limitation).
205. Derek Humphry, Oregon's Assisted Suicide Law Gives No Sure Comfort to Dying, N.Y.
Tams, Dec. 3, 1994, at A22.
In a controlled study in the Netherlands, 90 people were given, at their request, nine grams of
barbiturate by mouth. Sixty-eight died quickly-within two hours. The rest lingered as long
as four days; in 15 instances the doctor gave a lethal injection because the oral drugs were
causing protracted suffering to the patient, the family and himself.
Il
206. Op- R-v. STAT. § 163.125 (1990) ("Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter in the sec-
ond degree when... [a] person intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide.").
207. Marzen, supra note 15, at 825.
208. See notes 100-103 supra and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Before long, the Supreme Court will probably reconsider the right to PAE.
In doing so, the Court must choose among three options: (1) No one, not even
those who are dependent upon artificial life support, has a fundamental right to
choose how to die; (2) All competent patients with a subjective desire to die
that is objectively rational have a fundamental right to choose how to die; and
(3) Those who are dependent upon artificial life support have a fundamental
right to die with dignity by natural PAE, but those who are not dependent upon
artificial life support do not have a fundamental right to die with dignity by
artificial PAE.
The first option is no longer tenable. A competent, terminally ill patient has
a fundamental right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment because: (1)
The Supreme Court's holding in Cruzan is consistent with the view that this is
a fundamental right; (2) The common law right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition; (3) In response
to recent advances in medical technology, state and federal courts and state
legislatures have expanded that traditional common law right to encompass the
right of a competent, terminally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment; and (4) Every federal court and state court of last resort that has
considered the issue agrees that the right of a competent, terminally ill patient
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment outweighs countervailing state inter-
ests. Arguments to the contrary fail, because they either: (1) fail to distinguish
the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment from suicide; or (2) adopt an
exceedingly narrow view of the scope of fundamental rights, which is inconsis-
tent with the dominant approach to substantive due process jurisprudence em-
bodied in the Casey joint opinion.
The third option is equally untenable. The liberty interests of competent,
terminally ill patients who seek natural PAE are indistinguishable from the lib-
erty interests of competent, terminally ill patients who seek artificial PAE; both
have a common interest in choosing how to die. Moreover, there is no signifi-
cant ethical distinction between natural and artificial PAE. The artificial/natu-
ral dichotomy is unrelated to the objective medical factors that constitute the
framework of the only coherent justification for our shared moral intuitions.
Finally, there is little, if any, rational relationship between the artificial/natural
dichotomy and the avowed policy objectives of protecting incompetent patients
from involuntary euthanasia, and protecting competent, vulnerable patients
from undue influence. In fact, the practice of natural PAE poses a greater risk
to incompetent patients than does the practice of artificial PAE, and the risks to
competent patients are comparable in the two cases.
The Supreme Court should adopt the second option and hold that all com-
petent patients with a subjective desire to die that is objectively rational have a
fundamental right to choose how to die. The "subjective desire" element in this
constitutional standard affirms the state's substantial interest in prohibiting in-
voluntary euthanasia. The "objective rationality" element affirms the state's
substantial interest in discouraging irrational suicide. Finally, this approach
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recognizes that the ideal of a good death is deeply rooted in the Western ethical
tradition, and that all competent patients with an objectively rational desire to
die share a common interest in death with dignity, regardless of whether they
seek natural PAE or artificial PAE.
Even assuming a fundamental right to choose how to die, states may still
enact restrictive legislation to promote their interest in preserving life. States
may limit the class of people eligible for voluntary PAE to include only compe-
tent patients with incurable and irreversible medical conditions. States may
also impose an additional eligibility criterion of a short life expectancy, pro-
vided that there is a judicial bypass procedure for competent patients with an
incurable and irreversible medical condition who do not satisfy the life expec-
tancy criterion. States may devise a variety of safeguards to help ensure that
patients are acting voluntarily, and that the preceding eligibility criteria are sat-
isfied. Finally, states may prohibit people other than physicians from assisting
suicide, but states may not prohibit physicians from administering a lethal dose
of medication to a qualified patient.
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